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Inclusive Development: Beyond Need, Not Creed 
Mariz Tadros and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler  
 
Summary 
This paper explores the extent to which development, in its frames of reference, policy 
and practice, is sensitive and responsive to religious inequalities. The research enquiry is 
guided by the question “to what extent does international development thinking, and 
policy-making engage with freedom of religion or belief?” This paper is largely focused 
on Western development thinking and programming, while recognising that there is a 
plethora of actors who are also increasingly engaged in international development, 
notwithstanding BRICS and the Gulf. The relationship between freedom of religion or 
belief and development continues to be severely under-explored in the literature, despite 
the copious body of scholarship that distinctively deals with each separately. The 
relevance of exploring the nexus between freedom of religion or belief and development 
is particularly significant in view of the increasing visibility of multilateral, bilateral and 
non-governmental action aimed towards advancing freedom of religion or belief through 
development or humanitarian aid. Western development thinking, policy and practice has 
always struggled with how to engage with religion. In this critical enquiry, we interrogate 
how far international development has become religion-aware, where conceptual strides 
have been made in engendering religion in development, and whether this has 
incorporated questions of freedom of religion or belief. In order to support freedom of 
religion or belief and have a full understanding of religious inequalities within 
international development, we need a distinct agenda that goes beyond ‘add religion 
and stir’.  
 
Keywords: FoRB, religion and development, religion-blind development, religion-
sensitive development, religion-aware development. 
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Introduction 
This paper is the first in a series exploring the nexus between freedom of religion or 
belief and international development. The objective of this paper is to interrogate how 
development practitioners and frameworks have engaged with the question of freedom 
of religion or belief (FoRB) as experienced by populations in which development 
interventions have been implemented. We explore questions such as “how sensitive is 
development planning and programming to inequalities faced by people based on their 
religious identity?” and “what explains the extent of sensitivity to religious inequalities in 
conceptions, framings and practices of development actors?” It is important to note that 
the aim of this paper is not to present an evaluation of every development policy, 
programme or theory from the perspective of the extent to which it is FoRB-sensitive or 
blind. The Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development (CREID) aims to 
contribute to the production of such evaluations in the upcoming years, however, this 
paper sets the case for the rationale from existing evidence for exploring how 
development policies, practices and theories have been framed in relation to exclusions 
on the basis of religious marginality, what factors have influenced or account for this, 
while situating the opportunities and challenges for FoRB-sensitive development policies 
and practices.  
 
We recognise that the notion of ‘development’ has many different meanings and is 
deeply contested and debated.  For many, development refers to improvements in 
material prosperity, such as income, land or resources.  This could be achieved through 
higher levels of education, health and training.  For others, development means freedom 
from oppression.  Still others talk about it in relation to social and psycho-social 
progress. Whatever it is, the term is always value-laden and normative. Here, we use it to 
refer to a multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral process involving social, economic and 
political change that aims to improve wellbeing. First, we engage with ‘development’ as a 
set of institutional processes and dynamics, as the rules of the game that inform 
programmes, policies and practices. We also engage with ‘development’ as a set of 
actors such as policymakers, programme planners and practitioners. Finally, we engage 
with development paradigms and key frameworks, denoting the idea that societies and 
countries are at differing stages of ‘development’ as set out by internationally recognised 
standards in relation to poverty, economic wellbeing, and a range of social and political 
indicators. 
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We realise that this eclectic use of the term ‘development’ runs the potential risk of 
generalising a wide array of actors’ normative positions, framings and polices.  In this 
paper, when known, we try to make any normative assumptions about development 
explicit.    
 
The term ‘religion’ can also signify a wide array of phenomena, and, as with 
development, our use of the term here will refer to different aspects. At times, we use 
the term religion to refer to faith and spirituality (while being mindful that the two are 
not always the same), at other times, we are referring to religious institutions, including 
patterns of religious-inspired behaviour and practice, and in other places, we speak 
about features of lived religion that may not be exclusively religious. Religion is not only 
about a particular set of religious beliefs or doctrines. It has also manifested itself in 
some instances in syncretism, indicating a dynamic and complex amalgamation of beliefs. 
Moreover, the lines between the secular and religious are porous, and clear divides 
separating the two into distinct spheres do not always exist (Tomalin 2015:9), as in this 
paper with our almost inter-changeable use of the term freedom of religion or belief 
(FoRB) and religious equalities. The most widely used definition of FoRB in much of the 
literature is informed by Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
stipulates that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
this right includes freedom to change, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance”.  
 
The strengths of the term freedom of religion or belief are many.  
 
First, it is a definition that encompasses both those who have religious beliefs and those 
who do not. Second, it articulates a wide array of expressions of agency around which 
freedom must be secured, from the invisible (thought) to very visible dimensions such as 
practice, teaching, etc. FoRB is a concept whose definition stems from a UN document 
that also encompasses other freedoms, a document around which there is a wide 
consensus in the human rights community.  A related strength is that the concept FoRB 
is widely used, having gained traction not only in human rights circles, but also in 
foreign affairs/international relations and diplomacy. However, some of its strengths may 
also represent its weaknesses. Today, globally, there is a backlash against human rights 
organisations, thereby diminishing their ability to undertake country-level work. 
Moreover, although critiques by both state and non-state actors around the inconsistent 
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and double standard application of international human rights by Western governments 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not new, they nevertheless cast their 
shadow on rights-based conceptions of FoRB. Finally, the fact that FoRB came to be 
associated with foreign policy engagements in some contexts has been a mixed blessing. 
On the one hand, the high level foreign policy engagements meant that it assumed a 
high profile, while on the other, it became politicised in a manner that made it difficult at 
times to disentangle from the broader political agenda of the governments championing 
it.  
 
As with any concept, the usefulness of the term FoRB for achieving its intended purpose 
is partly contingent on the audience or stakeholders it seeks to influence. One set of the 
key interlocutors for the CREID programme are practitioners and policymakers in 
international development - a sphere, it will be argued below, that does not have a long 
history of engagement with questions of inclusion/exclusion on account of religion or 
beliefs. The usefulness of using the term FoRB in the context of international 
development needs to be interrogated. On the one hand, Amartya Sen’s framing of 
development as freedom (see section two of this paper) has shaped international 
framings of development in fundamental ways. Moreover, the human rights terms of 
reference for FoRB are also not alien to international development. In 2011, the UN 
celebrated the 25th anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly declaration on 
the right to development, which declared that development is an “inalienable right”. The 
document pronounced that everyone is “entitled to participate in, contribute to, and 
enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized”.1 Hence, both conceptions of freedom and 
rights, so integral to the conception of FoRB, have also informed various iterations of 
international development as a framework and as a concept.  
 
However, it is also critical to note that the politicisation of FoRB also has implications for 
development programme policymakers and practitioners who are conscious of their 
positionality (see section one of this paper). In contexts where international development 
actors are working in deeply circumscribed spaces where being associated with political 
agendas with a big “P” can lead to them sharing the same fate as human rights 
organisations, this presents another consideration for how they speak to 
inclusion/exclusion. It is in this context and against the backdrop of issues of positionality 
that we engage with FoRB in this paper as religious equality. 
 
1  www.un.org/en/events/righttodevelopment/declaration.shtml 
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The concept and language of ‘equality’ in many development circles is very powerful. 
Gender equality, for example, is a core element of international development. The aim 
here is to redress inequalities that people suffer on account of their religion or beliefs. 
We recognise that there are limitations to the concept of religious equality. First, as it 
does not speak explicitly to those who have no beliefs, it can be misinterpreted as 
exclusively focusing on those who are marginalised on account of having religious beliefs 
or being perceived as such. Second, there is a risk of equality being associated with 
parallel sets of rights, i.e. separate groups who are equal. On the other hand, as will be 
discussed in section three, equality has come to be used in international development in 
a relational manner, i.e. equal in relation to whom/what, which means that we can use it 
to incorporate those of no belief too. Moreover, the term religious equality speaks to an 
intended outcome that entails redressing power differentials, not only addressing 
restrictions on freedom.  
 
It is important to also engage with the question of religious equality in relation to whose 
rights need acknowledgement and redressing. In very broad terms, the reference here is 
to those who experience any process of “otherisation” or discrimination on account of 
the religious identity they hold or are associated with. This applies to situations where 
individuals or communities suffer because of intersecting identities. In other words, when 
their religious identity intersects with other identity qualifiers such as gender, race, class, 
geographic location, political orientation, or others. The need to redress religious 
inequality also applies to those who self-identify as atheist or are associated with 
atheism in contexts where society is intolerant of those who are of non-faith.  
 
The need to address religious equality as part of an inclusive development agenda, it will 
be argued in this paper, is particularly pressing for individuals and groups where being a 
numerical minority is also associated with experiencing other forms of exclusion or 
marginalisation, be it political, economic, social, or a combination thereof. In view of the 
diversity of the situation and status of religious minorities globally, it is difficult to arrive 
at a definition of universal application that works consistently for every group. The UN’s 
accepted definition is: “A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a 
State, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the State - 
possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the 
population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving 
their culture, traditions, religion or language” (OHCHR). This definition is important in 
that it suggests that majority/minority demarcation is not only based on numbers but a 
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relationship of non-dominance. In other words, a relationship where large members of a 
religious group experience power inequalities. 
 
Undoubtedly these power relations of inequality are dynamic: members of a religious 
group may be a religious minority from a power point of view in one context but not 
another and their situation may change across time. Moreover, they may experience 
power differentials of privilege and subordination within the group based on class, 
gender and other identifiers. This is perhaps where the third qualifier to what constitutes 
a religious minority becomes very important: that the group shows implicitly or explicitly 
a sense of solidarity with a feature that they find distinguishes them from the religious 
majority. As with any grouping, this sense of community may experience periods of acute 
awareness and other periods where this identity is submerged under others - 
nationalistic, political, geographic, tribal or otherwise. There is no blueprint for how 
redressing religious inequalities in contexts of international development programming 
in-country can be addressed, but we endeavour to initiate the conversation on this in 
part three of this paper.   
 
Perhaps where conceptual clarity is most needed is on the question of whether it is 
possible to use a religion-sensitive and FoRB-sensitive approach to development 
interchangeably. We argue in this paper that while there are some important 
convergences, we are also dealing with very distinct divergences. However, in order to 
understand the overlap and digression, we need to start with the genealogy of both 
ideas. In other words, the historical emergence of a movement to bring about a 
paradigmatic shift to integrate, conceptually and operationally, religious actors, beliefs, 
norms and practices in international development policy engagements and 
programming, and the historical emergence of FoRB as an ideal that cannot be ignored 
or sidelined in international relations and policy. We explore this largely by focusing on 
the actors and spaces through which these two movements emerged (see part one), 
seeking to probe behind the blind spots of development. In part two, we explore some 
of the conceptual, methodological and programmatic framings of international 
development, specifically the human capabilities approach, livelihood and social capital 
framings, horizontal inequalities and the most recent ‘leaving no one behind’ agenda. We 
explore the extent to which those discriminated against on the basis of religious identity, 
whether individually or collectively, have been recognised, engaged with, and integrated 
into development conceptual frameworks and programmes.  
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Drawing from this review and analysis, in the third and final part of this paper we explore 
where the opportunities and challenges lie for synergies between international 
development frameworks and programming and freedom of religion or belief. This is 
viewed from two perspectives; the first looks at ways in which addressing freedom of 
religion or belief can make development more inclusive and responsive to glaring 
inequalities on the ground; the second explores how international development can 
make FoRB more meaningful and relevant for the lives of those most affected by 
religious discrimination in ways which complement other strategies of engagement (such 
as diplomacy or human rights). We expose the critical tensions inherent in such 
processes, and the kinds of paradigmatic shifts that need to happen, in terms of 
language and framing, operational practice, and most importantly, epistemological 
changes needed to think outside the box to make FoRB-sensitive development a reality.   
 
 
1  Development, Religion and FoRB: 
Contested Narratives  
The definition of international development is contested. Over the years the definitions 
and framings have evolved substantially and there continue to be contending narratives 
that range between narrow econometric understandings and broader, more holistic 
conceptions. If development is defined as “organized intervention in collective affairs 
according to a standard of improvement” (Nederveen Pieterse 2010:3), then the history 
of development can be traced back to colonialism and the interventionist strategies of 
colonial powers in the affairs of the colonised in the name of bringing enlightenment 
and progress (Deacon and Tomalin 2015). If international development were to be 
defined more narrowly in terms of a “deliberate and planned process of 
intergovernmental cooperation to promote human well-being” (Clarke 2009:385), it is 
generally traced back to the aid architecture put in place after the Second World War by 
Western powers to enable countries with newly gained independence to ‘catch up’. Such 
an architecture involved the setting up of international development programmes whose 
raison d’être was to establish pathways of transition from underdevelopment to 
development.  
 
The most dominant paradigm which informed thinking and development policy in the 
early 1950s was modernisation theory. Much of modernisation theory assumed that 
economic development necessitated that societies shed their rural “backward” values, 
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norms and beliefs in order to gradually move towards more “modern”, scientific and 
rational ways of thinking (Ver Beek 2000; McDuie-Ra and Rees 2010). The backwardness, 
assumed to be associated with the agricultural arena, presented itself as religious beliefs, 
risk aversion and a general tendency that held up the steady march forward of economic 
progress.  Development became associated with a secularism whose iterations meant not 
only a relegation of the “religious” to the private sphere, but an abandonment of norms 
and beliefs informed by religion more generally (Ager and Ager 2016; Deneulin and Bano 
2009; Deneulin and Rakodi 2011). The prevalence of other theories of development, such 
as those proposed by Neo-Marxists, were no less teleological in elucidating a set of 
steps required by countries and societies in the global South to follow in order to 
‘develop’. Such theories also tended to see religion as an obstacle to development, to be 
pushed to the margins if progress were to be achieved.  
 
Clarke (2009:385) suggests that from the 1950s and for the next five decades, 
development was characterised by two approaches to religion: “secular reductionism”, 
which he defines as “the neglect of religious variables in favour of other sociological 
attributes such as class, ethnicity and gender”, and “materialistic determinism”, in terms 
of “the neglect of non-material, especially religious, motivations in explaining individual 
or institutional behaviour”.  Moreover, international development was a sphere 
dominated by economists whose vision of change focused on bringing about economic 
growth (Jones and Petersen 2011; Narayanan 2016). Development assistance was given 
the semblance of being normative-free in the sense that it was represented as a 
technocratic process led by experts who can quantify, process and produce the objective 
facts to bring about optimum results (Mitchell 2002). Framed in that fashion, it was 
difficult to quantify the immaterial dimension of religion. Consequently, for several 
decades, development scholarship was “religion-blind” – disconnected from the pervasive 
power of religion as a reality. This in no way suggests that faith-based actors were not 
involved in development work, nor that they were excluded from funding. However, 
collaborations with faith-based actors came about in spite of their religious identity and 
not in acknowledgement of it (Tadros 2011). The oversight of religion in development 
was so systemic that Ver Beek suggests it amounted to a taboo. Ver Beek’s seminal 
article Spirituality: a development taboo (2000) demonstrated the ways in which 
“people's spirituality is integrally interconnected with the decisions they make regarding 
their development and that development interventions often change people's spirituality 
and society without encouraging reflection upon or gaining consent to those changes” 
(Ver Beek 2000:41). 
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Moreover, the challenge was not only ideological, it was practical. Those leading the 
planning, programming and monitoring of international development in the Global South 
were often from Western contexts where secularism was predominant (Ver Beek 2000; 
McDuie-Ra and Rees 2010). This meant that, for the large part, development scholars, 
programmers and practitioners did not have the understanding or capacity to address 
the myriad ways in which religion manifested itself on the ground (MuDuie-Ra and Rees 
2010). As mentioned in the introduction, religion can mean many different phenomena 
and will overlap with culture on the ground. Religious shapes culture insofar as religious-
inspired values, rites and rituals inform people’s everyday social norms and practices. 
Conversely, culture shapes religious practices insofar as dynamic and intergenerational 
societal values and practices that do not originate in religion influence how religion is 
practiced. This interface between religion and culture complicates the nature of the 
phenomena that development policymakers and practices engage with on the ground.  
 
A critique of the disconnect between theories and reality contributed to a number of 
paradigmatic shifts that had implications on the positioning and role of religion in 
development. First, the fundamental precept of modernisation theory, that religion would 
lose its relevance as people develop and modernise, was incongruent with the reality on 
the ground and was challenged on account of its lack of universal application. For 
example, the relationships between modernisation, development and change were 
complex and non-linear.  In many countries in the global South, development in its 
myriad manifestations did not entail an abandonment of religion. In some cases, it co-
existed with a rise in the prevalence of religion in various forms such as expressed 
spirituality and through communal worship, but also through the formation of political 
parties and movements with fundamentalist and radical interpretations of religious 
doctrine, or pro-democracy social movements that were inspired by religious values. In 
many Gulf countries, development meant high economic growth, rapid technological 
development and the selective adoption of Western consumerist patterns with a strong 
retention of the power of the religious in the political, economic and social organisation 
of society. It was not only in the global South that the myth of development leading to 
the erosion of religion was debunked. In US domestic and international policy, an 
alliance between religious “social conservatives” and predominantly secular “fiscal 
conservatives” in the Republican Party and their rising influence among the polity meant 
a pushback against the relegation of the role of religion to the private realm (Jakobsen 
and Bernstein 2009:12).  
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It is interesting that the scholarship critiquing modernisation theory for its religion-blind 
nature comes from scholars and practitioners from very different epistemic stances and 
vantage points; it was not only those for whom religion played a central role in their 
lives (in the West and in the global South) that called for a paradigmatic shift. In the 
1990s, post-colonialist theorists challenged Western development’s engagement with 
actors “in their own image”, excluding those who profess identities not aligned with their 
own, and challenged the notion that modernisation meant westernisation (Rakodi 
2015:17). Post-colonialist critiques of international development as an ontological project 
became more prominent in development studies as they pressed for recognition of 
alternative models of change situated in the plurality of people’s experiences, realities, 
perceptions and visions. 
 
The importance of understanding the role of religious actors in development in the 
1990s can also be traced to the shift from state welfare to welfare pluralism models of 
development, against the backdrop of the pursuit of the neoliberal policies of structural 
adjustment and retrenchment. While many faith-based organisations have been 
providing services for literally centuries, it is in the same time frame as adjustment 
policies and talk of social safety nets that they rose in significance in international 
development policy, practice and increasingly scholarship as well. The incurring hardship 
on the poor marked an increased role for civil society organisations (including faith-
based organisations) to fill the gap in unmet welfare needs (Clarke 2006:837). Studies 
suggest that the role of faith-based organisations in mitigating hardship has been 
underestimated and that any promotion of grassroots community development 
involvement could not ignore their outreach capacity (White and Deneulin 2009).  
 
The plethora of Christian and Muslim NGOs working in Africa and organisations working 
in some Middle Eastern countries are cases in point. For example, in Nigeria, Pentecostal 
churches (providing spiritual and material assistance) gained popularity against the 
backdrop of economic adjustment policies and their impact on vulnerable groups (Ruth 
Marshall 1991). While Marshall insists that there are other reasons for people’s attraction 
to this new religious wave, she also points to the ways in which, through religious 
fellowship, followers have established informal faith-based initiatives to help peers 
survive economically. For example, small neighbourhood groups not only provide 
spiritual support but also welfare support and services for followers, including financial 
resources, in-kind support and health services (Marshall 1991:25). These are not only 
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present in the global South but have a strong presence in the West as well in the form 
of organised campaigns against poverty, food banks, shelters, and a wide array of 
outreach activities.  
 
A body of scholarship emerged showing how a religion-prejudiced lens meant that faith-
based organisations (FBOs) were considered as partisan by donors and therefore deemed 
unfit to engage in broader development work (Boehle 2010; Carbonnier, Kartas and 
Tudor Silva 2013; Clarke 2009). Gary Clarke (2007) outlines how the shift within donor 
organisations towards engaging FBOs in development activities came in response to 
those advocating for the inclusion of religion in development. It is interesting to note 
that this shift in international development policy was donor-driven, mostly top-down, 
but championed by leaders/actors within the development arena. In 1998, the World 
Bank was one of the first organisations to engage with religion, rendering religious 
actors visible by creating platforms such as the World Faiths Development Dialogue, 
established in collaboration with the Archbishop of Canterbury. This dialogue focused on 
engaging religious actors, primarily FBOs, in poverty reduction efforts Marshall 2015:386) 
The UN Population Fund (UNFPA), in particular through the work of Azza Karam, became 
the UN agency most associated with interrogating ways of making international 
development less religion-blind. In the 1990s, bilateral agencies such as the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) also, for the first time in history, 
developed a faith and development manifesto, spearheaded by Mike Battcock. The 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also experienced a shift, 
later, to include an office for engaging religion.  In all of these cases, these champions 
were well positioned to lead processes of engendering religion in development on 
account of their influential positions within their respective organisations, their 
dissemination of research elucidating the merits and pitfalls of religion-aware and 
religion-blind development respectively, and their efforts to create bridges with faith 
organisations.  
 
In the 2000s, Western powers shifted in part their strategy for engaging with 
development and religion. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was a significant shift towards 
engaging with ‘religion’ through the security agenda. Western countries’ engagement in 
the War on Terror, in the aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers in the United 
States in 2001, contributed to the securitisation of development. Security actors sought 
to instrumentalise religion and religious actors via international development as part of 
the exercise of soft power against Islamic radicalism (Tadros 2010). In Western policy, this 
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manifested itself in the strong collusion between the security and development agendas 
in Muslim-majority contexts in which Western international development donors sought 
to work with religious leaders in a bid to pull the carpet from underneath the feet of 
more radical groups. In these highly securitised contexts, donors conceived of religious 
actors as the conduits through which the “right religion” would be taught, particularly to 
young people. In some contexts, religious leaders came to be consulted on everything 
from the construction of roads to women’s reproductive health (Balchin 2011).  In other 
words, there were phases in some contexts where development programmers and 
practitioners shifted their country-level policies from ignoring religion to considering the 
involvement of religious actors to be essential for all development interventions. This was 
observed in particular through engagements with religious radical groups in contexts 
considered to be of top security concern for the West. Where development policy and 
practice had once shunned religion (secular reductionism), it was now considered 
essential (religious essentialism) (Tadros 2013). This kind of religious “romanticism” 
essentialised people’s identities, seeing them exclusively as believers, rather than as 
people with multiple, intersectional identities. In a bid to show the benefits of engaging 
with religious actors, sometimes the trade-offs and tensions that this entailed for 
inclusive development were overlooked or side-lined (Tadros 2013; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 
2015). The late Cassandra Balchin (2011:17) an activist-practitioner, shared the following 
case study:  
 
I recall the fury of a women’s rights activist from the Mindanao region in the 
Philippines in the 1990s. A foreign bilateral agency had apparently gathered local 
ulemas [religious leaders] in order to produce a statement supporting women’s 
reproductive rights from an Islamic perspective. Although this was not a normal 
sphere of the local ulema’s concern, the statement was duly issued, but more 
importantly, the gathering facilitated networking among the ulema that 
subsequently contributed to the formation of a political grouping that promoted 
a fundamentalist vision of Islam. In other words, a development approach 
reinforced conservative interpretations of religion and strengthened the power of 
those who do not have pluralism and equality at heart. 
 
The above encapsulates the dangers of a pendulum that swings from complete oversight 
of religion to one that assumes religious actors are exclusive mediators and pathways for 
eliciting change for development. Similar incidents of the assumed capacity by Western 
actors to instrumentalise religion have been noted by Fountain and Peterson (2018). In 
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the case of the Mindanao region mentioned above, the unintended outcome was an 
undermining of women’s rights activists who had been advancing women’s reproductive 
health rights, and the empowerment of the ulemas to promote an agenda that 
circumscribes these rights.   
 
In the next section we highlight the dangers of assuming that the promotion of a 
religious-sensitive lens onto development will, by default, incur a positive impact on the 
promotion of religious equality as a dimension of inclusive development policy and 
practice.  
 
 
1.1 Religion in development and FoRB: Two sides of the same coin or 
diverging foci?   
 
A review of the religion and development literature shows minimal engagement with the 
question of religious marginality and inequalities among and within communities or with 
FoRB more broadly. There is some scholarship examining the institutional discrimination 
facing religious minorities; for example in the labour market (Basedau, Govien and 
Prediger 2018), housing sector (Marshall and Van Saanen 2007), health sector (Martin 
2008), and some explorations of intersectionality, such as in David Mosse’s seminal work 
on how the intersection between caste, religious affiliation and discrimination impacts on 
people’s access to development in India (2012, 2018). Such work also includes Frances 
Stewart’s (2008) important work on horizontal inequalities (2008) relating to religious and 
ethnic minorities’ collective experience of marginalisation and its relationship to violence. 
Nonetheless, by and large, the nexus of religion-identity-development-inequality is 
virtually absent in the religion and development scholarship, and even more so in 
development programming.  
 
What explains the paucity of academic and practical work on religious inequality and 
discrimination in the religion and development field, one that calls for a systematic study 
of religion on the ground? Perhaps one core explanation lies in the genealogy of religion 
in development and the movement for recognition of FoRB in international policy. The 
paradigmatic shift to integrate religion in development was brought about by 
development actors from within the field engaging with religious leaders and religious 
actors more broadly. However, a movement to integrate FoRB in development is still very 
nascent. The movement to elevate FoRB to a critical feature of Western foreign policy 
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has its origins in the work of pioneering academics such as Jonathan Fox, Timothy Shah, 
Allen Hertzke, Byron Johnson and many others. 
 
Despite the fact that the principle of the right to FoRB has featured in international 
human rights conventions dating back to the 1950s, a scoping report of the origin of 
concerted action around FoRB (Barker and Bennett 2018) identifies 1998 as the critical 
juncture for bringing the issue to centre stage in global policy, when the United States 
prioritised the promotion and defence of international religious freedom through its 
foreign policy following the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA). 
Barker and Bennett (2018:17) note that since the IRFA was enacted, “violations of 
religious freedom have received greater attention by an increasing number of multilateral 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), and more 
than a dozen countries identify the promotion of international religious freedom as a 
core element of their foreign policy.”2 In 2016, the EU designated a special envoy for 
Freedom of Religion of Belief, Mr Ján Figeľ, and in 2018 the EU parliament published 
special guidelines on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief3, with an intra-
parliamentary group publishing an annual report on the state of FoRB globally4. A 
number of countries have followed suit with the establishment of their own special 
envoys for FoRB, including Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands 
and others.  
 
The scoping report details fairly high-level action on FoRB, including bilateral 
government engagements and multilateral platforms, mostly also featuring governments. 
While established in the Cold War for cooperation across ideological divides, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) represents one of the oldest 
multilateral platforms through which issues of freedom of belief, conscience and thought 
are discussed. A more recent initiative includes the International Panel of 
Parliamentarians for Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFoRB), established in November 
2014 at the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo, Norway. In that meeting, 30 parliamentarians 
from 17 countries signed the Oslo Charter for Freedom of Religion or Belief, the 
founding document of IPPFoRB. The Canadian government, via its Canadian Office for 
Religious Freedom, further established an International Contact Group on Freedom of 
Religion or Belief (ICG) in 2015. While the full list of the 20 participating countries has 
 
2  See also the work of Hertzke on the origins of the emergence of FoRB in foreign policy and 
the edited volume by Durham et al.  
3  EU Guidelines: www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0449_EN.html 
4  European Parliament Intergroup on Freedom of Religion or Belief and Religious Tolerance 
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not been made publicly known, they include the United States, the UK, Norway, 
Cameroon, Jordan and Indonesia (Baker and Bennett 2018). A preliminary analysis of 
multilateral or bilateral activities suggests that most of their work is premised on 
documenting and monitoring FoRB violations in countries and raising issues of violations 
of FoRB through policy dialogues with the government at hand. There is additionally 
substantial work on collecting data, undertaking training for diplomats and providing 
toolkits.   
 
Increasingly, however, a number of governments are claiming to include religious 
inequality in their development activities. For example, Barker and Bennett (2018) 
illustrate that the Danish Mission Council Development Department (DMCDD), which 
manages a pooled fund that primarily supports poverty reduction initiatives in 
developing countries, had its budget increased by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2017 
with the expectation that future development projects will address FoRB.  
 
Three other initiatives are more focused on Christian minorities.  In 2011, Norway 
established the Minority Project, focusing on Christian minorities in the Middle East and 
improving the situation of vulnerable religious groups worldwide. The project is led by 
the Special Envoy for Human Rights, who reports to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
Initiatives “include the creation of monitoring and early warning mechanisms for 
vulnerable groups and the development of measures to improve conditions for 
persecuted religious minorities who are being subjected to harassment and 
discrimination” (Barker and Bennett 2018:61-2). There is also the State Secretariat for the 
Aid of Persecuted Christians in Hungary, which sits in the Prime Minister’s Office, and as 
the name suggests is a state agency committed to improving humanitarian and 
developmental assistance to Christians suffering persecution in the Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa. Moreover, in 2019, the British government launched an investigation into 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) response to the persecution of Christians 
globally, and issued a number of recommendations for targeted actions, presented in 
what became commonly known as the Bishop of Truro’s Report.  
 
Most of these initiatives are engaged in diplomacy and the exceptions, such as USAID’s 
Center for Faith and Opportunity Initiatives, are more broadly committed to the inclusion 
of faith-actors in development. It is important to note here that there are other country-
level initiatives that are specifically committed to supporting religious minorities of other 
faiths (for example Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and increasingly Qatar are earmarking resources 
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and technical support to supporting persecuted Muslims, however there is often very 
little information publicly available on their programmes or activities, see for example a 
report by Barzegar and El Karhili (2017) as an example of one scoping of the sector).  
 
Many of the large initiatives on the ground in the area of FoRB seem to have been 
designed and drawn in foreign affairs ministries and then rolled out in other countries.  
The implications of FoRB being the brainchild of foreign ministries for development are 
far reaching, as will be discussed below, however, it is important to note that Western 
governments also came under increasing pressure from internal lobby groups to 
demonstrate how not only their foreign policy but also their development and 
humanitarian policy was cognisant and responsive to the scale and severity of religious-
inspired human suffering in many parts of the world. Such pressure came largely from 
identity-based advocacy groups. Human rights organisations, whose raison d’être is to 
advance rights more broadly, have not engaged with FoRB violations in the same way as 
they have with violations based on political belief, gender or other identifiers (Petersen 
and Marshall 2018). Petersen and Marshall (2018:13) argue that “this does not mean that 
mainstream human rights organisations did not care about religiously based 
discrimination and conflict, but that they tended to see the topic as being ‘really’ about 
something other than religion – whether ethnic or racial discrimination, gender 
inequality, or political oppression – and as such, something tackled more usefully within 
e.g. frameworks on minority rights, non-discrimination, women’s rights, or freedom of 
expression than within a FoRB framework”. 
 
The challenge is that religious-inspired genocides were difficult to always subsume under 
different banners - ethnicity, geography or otherwise. Daesh’s cleansing of the Yazidis, 
Christians and other religious minorities was more recently officially recognised by the 
US State Department and then by the UN as a genocide. Additionally, whereas there is 
religious discrimination across the world, religious minorities in the Middle East face an 
existential crisis; the numbers of Kakais, Sabeans and others have shrunk so significantly 
that they are at risk of becoming altogether extinct. The scale and severity of the 
genocide of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar and religious cleansing of Christians in 
other parts of the country represents an international humanitarian crisis of a grand 
scale. Moreover, emerging research suggests that the scope, severity and reach of FoRB 
violations is no longer contained within national borders and is anything but of a modest 
scale. For example, the Pew Research 10 year (2007-2017) report shows that in 2017, 52 
governments imposed ‘either “high” or “very high” levels of restrictions on religion, up 
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from 40 in 2007. And the number of countries where people are experiencing the 
highest levels of social hostilities involving religion has risen from 39 to 56 over the 
course of the study’ (Pew Research Center 2019)5.   
 
As a result of FoRB and religion in development having very different genealogies, their 
agendas converge on some points but significantly diverge on others. The common 
factor between a religion-sensitive development agenda and a FoRB-sensitive one is that 
both recognise that religion is important and influential and has not been duly 
acknowledged or engaged with in development planning, programming or evaluations. 
Both agendas push back against the way in which religion has been conceptualised, 
classified or understood. Both consider the realm of the immaterial as significant and 
reject reductionist explanations that perceive religion as more likely than not a by-
product of another dynamic (class, ethnicity, geography). In order to make development 
more sensitive to religion, religious literacy would feature as one of the important 
elements of delivering on both agendas (FoRB and religion in development). Diane L. 
Moore, Director of the Religious Literacy Project at Harvard Divinity School, defines 
religious literacy as “the ability to discern and analyze the fundamental intersections of 
religion and social/political/cultural life through multiple lenses”, specifically through an 
understanding of the beliefs, central texts and practices of religious traditions and how 
these intersect with social, political and cultural spaces (The Religious Literacy Project 
2019). Some have argued for the integration of religious literacy in development 
(Gingerich et al. 2017) and a number of initiatives have been established to promote 
religious literacy in development using different methodologies and approaches. Some 
are in-house, involving the training of diplomats and policymakers inside ministries, while 
others are more open to anyone interested, such as the Joint Learning Initiative, the 
FoRB Learning Platform and ACT Alliance. Development field practitioners undertaking 
scoping studies, planners undertaking political economy analysis, programmers and 
monitoring and evaluation specialists would need to have the knowledge, mindset, 
attitude and skills at understanding the broad breadth of ways in which religious agency, 
history and doctrine influence power dynamics on the ground. These power dynamics 
would also require an understanding of how they work within groups and across groups.  
 
 
5  The Pew Research measures restrictions on religion rather than inequalities across groups or 
restrictions on those of no belief. However, in many instances where restrictions on religion prevail, 
these also apply to those of no belief (Humanist International 2019). 
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A common deficit characterising attempts at integrating FoRB and religion-aware 
development on the ground is that the movers and shakers within religious circles who 
wield power are largely men of religion, often advanced in years. This often means that 
in making development more FoRB-sensitive or religion sensitive, those invited to 
establish the terms of engagement, take decisions and represent communities, are older 
men, thereby excluding both women and youth. How to make development withstand 
the tendency to replicate the same hierarchies that we see in religious institutional 
leadership, i.e. gerontocratic and gender-biased, is a challenge.  
 
However, beyond recognition of religious agency and religious literacy competencies, 
there are some critical differences in the conception of a FoRB-sensitive development 
approach and a religion-aware one. If we conceive of both it would be wrong to assume 
that, since both agendas engage with religion, the terms they use would refer to the 
same phenomenon. The emphasis on the nature of power inequality at the heart of 
religion and development is different to that of the FoRB-in-development agenda. In 
religion-aware development policy, the desired outcome is the recognition and inclusion 
of religious discourses and actors (Berger 2014). A FoRB-sensitive development policy 
would focus not only on the secular-religious divide but on the divide within religious 
and non-religious groups as well. Moreover, whereas religion-sensitive development 
endeavours to integrate religious actors, norms and beliefs in understandings and 
interventions to bring about social change, a FoRB perspective also recognises the 
involvement of those of non-faith or no belief. Arguably since development 
programming, policies and practices have been secular by and large, it is the inequalities 
within groups and among those who hold religious beliefs that has been most 
challenging conceptually and operationally for development actors to tackle.  
 
Second, the scholarship for a religion-sensitive lens on development sought to redress 
how international policymakers and programmers discriminated against or ignored 
organisations on account of their faith. The most commonly used example was a USAID 
regulation that prevented the organisation from funding FBOs - a regulation that was 
overturned in 2004 on the basis that “USAID may not discriminate for or against a 
program applicant because the organization is motivated or influenced by religious faith 
to provide social services, or because of their religious character or affiliation” (USAID 
n.d.). The normative underpinning of the religion in development agenda (or at least 
subsets of it) has been to bring to the fore the positive role that religious agency has, in 
the form of leadership, organisations and discourses, and how this can contribute 
25 
 
towards a more holistic form of development. A case in point is the International 
Partnership on Religion and Sustainable Development, a convening platform funded by 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). According to its mandate 
“PaRD brings together governmental and intergovernmental entities with diverse civil 
society organisations (CSOs) and FBOs, to engage the social capital and capacities vested 
in diverse faith communities for sustainable development and humanitarian assistance in 
the spirit of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (PaRD n.d.). The point 
behind PaRD and other similar initiatives (such as the Joint Learning Initiative) is to bring 
to the fore the positive contributions of the religious in development.  
 
On the other hand, the theory of change underpinning FoRB-in-development is that 
there is a need to recognise and redress the inequalities that face people who are 
discriminated against on the basis of their faith, which means addressing the prejudices 
of both secular and religious actors. It recognises that the political appropriation of 
religion for the exercise of power has led to a growth of fundamentalist religious 
discourses and activisms that negatively impact religious inclusivity. Champions of a 
religion-sensitive lens onto development, whether academics or development 
practitioners, have focused on the exclusion of religious actors, understandings and 
beliefs by a persistent secular straitjacketing of development. However, champions of 
freedom of religion or belief in development recognise that the threats to religious 
inclusion lie not only with those who wish to exclude all expressions and forms of the 
religious from development, but also a range of religious actors, beliefs and practices 
which perpetuate religious otherisation.  
 
Third, and this is perhaps the greatest difference, is the question of the actors and 
agendas that are being incorporated into the development sphere. While not 
generalising, the rationale for bringing in religious leaders, FBOs and discourses into 
development was precisely because they are influential on the ground, because they 
have leverage, outreach and a gathering and sometimes provide critical services. In other 
words, religious actors may have been marginal to international development actors, 
spaces and agendas, but they were not in their own ‘local’ contexts. On the contrary, it 
was by understanding that they wield power in relation to others in their community that 
the case for recognition was made.  
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In contrast, the rationale for a religious equality agenda is precisely the reverse: that 
certain religious actors, often a numerical and political minority, are marginalised, 
overlooked, shunned and excluded, both individually and collectively.  It is not that they 
do not have power, nor that we wish to engage with them as simply victims who have 
no agency, but that relationally they suffer from being excluded from mainstream 
religious discourses, from legitimacy and from influence on account of their affiliation – 
or at least association with a religious identifier, a difference that is looked down upon. 
In other words, it is precisely because they suffer from multiple, intersecting forms of 
exclusion and powerlessness that they need to be incorporated, to redress their 
inequalities for a more inclusive development agenda.  
 
The differences in making development more religion aware and FoRB sensitive on 
account of the differential power base and positioning of religious leaders and actors on 
the one hand and members of marginalised religious communities on the other is 
significant operationally. For example, whereas the inclusion of religion in development 
practically may mean the invitation of faith leaders and organisations to contribute and 
partner with development actors, it is not so straightforward for religious minorities and 
non-believers. In some countries such as Pakistan, Ahmadis conceal their identity in order 
to avoid government crackdown. In Iraq, the Kakais proclaim publicly that they are 
Muslim in order to avoid extremist group assaults. The sensitivities around engaging with 
FoRB on the ground are immense; integrating FoRB in development is not a case of “add 
religious freedom to the religion and development agenda and stir”. This is because, 
while it builds on the importance of recognising the role of religious norms and beliefs 
in influencing, it specifically tackles the unequal power relations that people experience 
on account of being seen as the religious ‘other’, be they of the same faith as the 
majority, of a minority faith, or of no belief. Hence, the opportunities and challenges of 
mainstreaming FoRB in development are to a large extent different to those involved in 
adopting a religion-sensitive lens to development. The next part of this paper will 
highlight some of the specific issues with a FoRB-sensitive development agenda, and the 
subsequent part highlights some of the opportunities from within existing development 
frameworks.  
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Table 1.1 Tadros presentation, 15th October 2019, CREID seminar “Where Need 
Meets Creed”  
 Religion in development  FoRB in development 
Genealogy Led by development 
academics, programmers, 
practitioners and faith 
leaders in international 
development, early 1990s 
Diplomats, faith lobby 
groups, human rights 
activists and academics 
from foreign policy, human 
rights, late 1990s 
Aim  To integrate religious 
actors in their plurality and 
a faith lens  
into development 
Promoting FoRB/redress of 
religious inequalities as an 
essential dimension of 
inclusive development 
Paradigmatic shift needed Challenge the secular 
blindness of development 
Challenge secular blindness 
and blindness to religious 
inequalities 
Rationale Religious actors, 
institutions are powerful - 
cannot be ignored 
Religious minorities have 
been ignored because they 
suffer from power 
inequalities  
Who to involve?  Involvement of faith and 
religious actors in their 
plurality and diversity in 
development 
Development/human 
rights/foreign 
policy/security as well as 
faith actors  
Examples of interventions Faith literacy, secular-
religious dialogue 
Inter-faith service delivery, 
projects for empowerment 
of religious minorities  
Nemesis  Secularism  Religious, political and 
social homogenisation of 
all kinds that create a 
religious other 
Main critiques Potential reification of 
identities and exclusionary 
leadership 
Too politically contentious 
and potentially divisive 
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1.2 FoRB’s uneasy relationship with development  
The challenges of making international development frameworks, policymakers and 
practitioners more cognisant and responsive to religious inequalities are marked by both 
the limitations of present frameworks but also by the positionality of Western actors 
(how their intentions are perceived in the light of their identity6). A longue durée reading 
of Western powers’ engagement with religious pluralism in colonised countries sheds 
much light on why development academics and practitioners who wish to break with 
their countries past as colonisers are uncomfortable with incorporating FoRB in 
development. The history of British, French and Belgian colonialism is marked by a 
strategy of divide and rule or divide and conquer. Several religious conflicts around the 
world that have escalated into genocides have their roots in the interventions of 
colonialist powers in previous centuries. British colonialism in Myanmar has been 
considered to have contributed to the conditions for a backlash or desire for revenge 
against the ethno-religious minorities that the Buddhists began to perceive as a threat 
(Rogers 2018). In Egypt, British colonialist powers were believed to have sought to 
allocate resources in ways that created divisions between the Muslim majority and 
Christian minority. In India, the entrenchment of religious identities via the introduction 
of political and economic measures that supported mobilisation around communal 
religious identity lines is believed to have sowed mistrust and fear for loss of power. 
However, communal tensions and violence cannot all be reduced to the role of 
colonialism since in many cases tensions preceded colonialism, including in the cases 
mentioned above (Myanmar and Egypt).  
 
The second challenge for development actors to engage with the promotion of FoRB is 
concern with being perceived as extending the legacy of missionary activity in the global 
South, where missionary activity often accompanied a colonial presence. According to 
Fountain (2015), “contemporary Western development is a direct descendent of Christian 
proselytizing impulses, dispositions, practices, and organizational forms” (85). As with this 
quote above, the Christian missionary legacy has by and large been represented in a 
deeply negative light in much of the literature that development draws on (post-
colonialism, anthropology, etc., see Fountain for multiple examples of this). However, the 
salience of a negative representation of missionary activity also reflects the generalisation 
of a number of expressions of agency that are highly diverse in both denomination and 
 
6  While it is beyond the scope of this paper to unpack the subtle differences between western bilateral 
institutions and global ones such as the UN, it is important to note that in some quarters in the global 
South, the UN is seen as an instrument of western hegemony, see Puchala (2005).  
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relationship with the colonisers and the colonised across very different times and places. 
In a study of activist forms of Protestant missionaries, Woodbery (2012:254) notes that 
there is evidence that some missionary movements/groups played a central role in 
contributing to local groups’ capacities and skills to mobilise the masses against 
colonialist rule, in particular in the 19th century and early 20th century, stating that while 
some missionaries were paternalistic and racist, there is evidence too of others whose 
support for local populations was part of their commitment to societal reform, which in 
turn emanated from their faith. The evidence as expected will vary from context to 
context.  
 
The extent to which countries can position themselves as the protectors of religious 
harmony and cohesion without their colonial past casting a shadow on their credibility, 
and most importantly, their intentions, needs to be explored at length. There is certainly 
a gap in the evidence we have in this area.  Many countries consider the state of 
religious pluralism in their contexts as a matter of national sovereignty.  The question is 
not one of the contemporary record of promoting religious freedom or its coherence, 
but rather a question of perception. For example, in many colonial contexts in the Middle 
East, some indigenous churches responded to British colonialism in the 19th century by 
aligning themselves with Muslims. Their rejection of colonial patronage for their 
protection was informed by the desire to define themselves as patriotic churches (Tadros 
2016). In a context where indigenous churches’ patriotism is always under scrutiny, the 
extent to which a collaboration with a former colonial power can create a public image 
problem cannot be underestimated. This of course varies from one context to another 
and one phase to the next.  
 
Yet the United States, the most vocal promoter of religious freedom which does not 
have a colonial legacy of divide and rule, cannot boast a positive track record of 
pursuing policies that promote social cohesion, pluralism and religious equality. The 
legacy of the American occupation of Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is 
believed to have contributed to the generation of religious intolerance which reached 
the level of religious cleansing in the beginning of the 21st century. The fact that the 
United States is spearheading FoRB through foreign policy instruments and continues to 
be the main player in the field is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it has meant 
that there is substantial weight and visibility given to FoRB that was absent before. All of 
the multilateral initiatives, even when not led by the US, have involved high level US 
foreign representation. More recently in 2018, Mike Pence, the Vice-President of the US, 
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held an inter-ministerial meeting on FoRB in Washington, followed by a second in 2019. 
These were well attended, with over 3,000 participants. This has given visibility to the 
issue and allowed for the exchange of ideas and strategies across different actors.  
 
On the other hand, the association of US foreign policy with FoRB is not without its 
challenges for legitimacy. Wherever or whenever American foreign policy suffers from a 
credibility or legitimacy deficit, its promotion of FoRB by default also suffers among 
some domestic and external actors. The question of the alignment of American foreign 
and domestic policy with promotion of FoRB has again raised questions on the impacts 
and outcomes for redressing religious inequality on the ground for those who need it 
most. For example, while Donald Trump has explicitly identified Christians from countries 
such as Syria as particularly vulnerable and a priority for his administration (Brody 2017), 
this has not translated into consistent policy. A report in Christianity Today (CT) notes 
that for 2018, “though most of the refugees welcomed over the past year are Christians, 
the overall drop means far fewer believers are finding refuge in the US than in prior 
years. In the 2018 fiscal year, 15,748 Christian refugees entered the country, a 36.4 
percent decline from the previous year and a 55 percent decline from fiscal year 2016” 
(Jackson 2018). Within that overall decline in refugee populations and in the number of 
Christian refugees admitted, the drop is also very notable for Christians from the Middle 
East, as noted by the CT report: “only 70 Christians from places like Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Palestine, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen were resettled in the US in the last fiscal year [2018], 
compared to more than 3,000 Christians from the region who came in fiscal year 2017”. 
The restrictions on refugee entry harmed other religious minorities more substantially 
than Christians, yet even the latter’s vulnerability has increased. This demonstrates that 
broader policy (restrictions of refugee intake) has had an impact that far outweighs that 
of having a high-level US government-sponsored summit on freedom of religion or 
belief. Herein lies the conundrum: broader policies can have unintended outcomes, 
undermining religious freedom, that outweigh the formulation of policies that seem on 
the surface to specifically aim at redressing religious inequality. Operationally, for 
example, USAID has announced that it will pursue an aid policy that ensures that 
development assistance in Iraq is sensitive to FoRB. However, if the broader US foreign 
policy in Iraq contributes to insecurity, religious minorities will consider it unsafe to 
participate in developmental activities funded by USAID. 
 
The challenge of integrating FoRB in development is exacerbated by polarisation 
globally, but particularly in the US, between the right and left on human rights. While the 
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promotion of religious freedom is commensurate with a human rights approach to 
development, the polarisation between right and left has also seeped into this sector. 
Which rights become fashionable in development planning and programming is not only 
premised on the urgency of the situation on the ground or the information available, but 
also on the political orientation of power-holders responsible for decision-making. The 
extent to which FoRB is associated with a rightwing rights agenda and whether this has 
an influence on its uptake in development requires further exploration. One observation 
is that left-leaning academics, think tanks, development actors and sometimes politicians 
are more likely to defend the rights of religious minorities (particularly Muslims) living in 
the West, while their right-wing oriented counterparts tend to defend the rights of 
religious minorities internationally. For example, in the UK, the left-leaning Labour party 
released a Race and Faith Manifesto for the 2019 national elections (Labour 2019). In this 
manifesto Labour made one mention of Christians in passing, alongside other groups, in 
their right to attire without discrimination. On the other hand, in the same document, 
they made six mentions specific to the rights of Muslims domestically. Conversely, the 
Conservative party 2019 party manifesto spoke about defending all faiths from 
persecution domestically but also added that they will seek to implement the Truro 
report, which proposed a series of recommendations for improving the situation of the 
persecution of Christians overseas (Conservatives 2019). These represent deep-seated 
ideological fault lines which are beyond the scope of this paper to analyse, but which are 
important to take note of as they inevitably have spill over effects on international 
development, whether directly or in more subtle ways.  
 
Moreover, the integration of FoRB in development operationally carries different risks to 
those involved in raising the issue through diplomatic channels. The promotion of FoRB 
in foreign policy does not involve grassroots work often because of concerns that direct 
engagement with the population on the ground would be considered a violation of a 
country’s sovereignty or a form of espionage. Diplomats often raise issues of religious 
freedom in bilateral policy dialogues or through multilateral conferences/summits, etc. 
Some embassies do have, through their political office, local researchers that gather 
information on the state of religious freedom, which sometimes involves interviews with 
various stakeholders, however, these interviews tend to be with elites and undertaken in 
a relatively insulated environment.  
 
On the other hand, the integration of freedom of religion or belief in development has 
very different risks associated with it. First, if development programmes are funded 
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through bilateral or multilateral assistance, the programme must be negotiated with the 
host government. As several donors interviewed pointed out, if a partner country does 
not identify issues of religious inclusion as a priority issue in the development agenda, it 
is very difficult to include it. For FoRB to be meaningful, it needs to be embedded in 
existing development programmes and it needs to be multiscale, involving work with 
communities at a grassroots level. Similar challenges are faced by non-state actors 
working on FoRB as human rights organisations, however with some major differences. 
 
In many religiously heterogeneous contexts where religious intolerance is high, the status 
and situation of religious minorities is considered a national security matter, which means 
that it is conceived to be the remit of security officials to govern sectarian tensions and 
manage them. For example, in Egypt, when sectarian violence erupts against Christians in 
local communities, the security apparatus convenes what they term “reconciliation 
committees” which force perpetrators and victims to sit together and agree to non-
escalation. These reconciliation committees have obfuscated the role of the police and 
the judiciary in enforcing rule of law and have led to the usurping of justice for victims 
(Tadros 2013). The local development practitioners who wish to engage in work that 
promotes social cohesion in such contexts may be seen to cross a red line since they are 
‘intruding’ on the sphere governed by the security apparatus, unless the latter has given 
them the greenlight to work.  
 
The risks of backlash for bilateral or multilateral actors, should they be seen as working 
in a highly sensitive area, are very substantial in some contexts. A very conspicuous risk 
is that authorities would regard working on religious inequalities as an act of domestic 
interference, not of poverty alleviation, and on account of this, rule out the aid package 
altogether. One donor7 working in Pakistan said that any inclusion of religious inequality 
issues in their development work might put their whole programme at risk of closure if 
the government were hostile to it. The second and related risk is that at a community 
level, a foreign-funded programme engaging with issues affecting religious minorities 
would incur the wrath of nationalist and religious fundamentalists who would collectively 
organise to thwart it. In other words, it carries the risk of a societal backlash if 
communities reject interventions that serve to improve the situation of religious 
minorities, leading to their rejection of other developmental interventions and 
 
7  All reference to donors in this section have been anonymised upon their request. 
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jeopardising further work with other vulnerable groups (Mohmand, unpublished paper 
2018). A third, and again inter-related risk is that both bureaucracies and political parties 
back home (where donors are based) would dispute the value and relevance of aid that 
does not have immediate and demonstrable impact on the ground. Given the pressures 
on donors to show how funding for development interventions has produced impact, 
demonstrating changes in the status of religious minorities or changes in social cohesion 
is very difficult within the cycle of a project.  
 
In addition to the positionality of donors and contextual sensitivities, there are also 
institutional challenges for development actors to engage with integrating or 
mainstreaming freedom of religion or belief in their programming. The first is associated 
with planners’/practitioners’ own positionality and personal stances on issues to do with 
religious discrimination. This is distinctly different from a lack of knowledge associated 
with religious illiteracy, but rather about the personal insights and experiences of 
development professionals. It is not part of their conventional development practice to 
be reflexive about their own personal prejudices, stances and positioning on matters to 
do with religious persecution. Do practitioners consider religious discrimination as 
“artificial” or “imposed by the West”? Do they have issues with recognising a group 
being religiously marginalised in one context but in the position of a perpetrator of 
religious prejudice in another? As the late Cassandra Balchin reflected from a number of 
workshops with staff at Oxfam: 
 
What does being politically neutral mean? No matter what Oxfam’s institutional 
approach, the NGOs it partners with and individual staff are bound to have their 
own political preferences. In many contexts, political preferences are closely tied 
up with approaches to religion (e.g. supporting a party that promotes secularism, 
or conservative interpretations of religion), while partner NGOs may be the public 
wings or undisclosed fronts of political forces. (Balchin 2011:11) 
 
One of the major disconnects in attitudes towards engaging with FoRB is the assumption 
amongst some practitioners that those who seek to redress religious inequalities are 
people of faith. This is not specific to those who work in development, with the same 
assumption observed by Petersen and Marshall (2018:15) amongst human rights activists: 
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“Among secular human rights organisations, conversely, this misperception of FoRB as a 
right that primarily concerns religious communities and individuals is – in part – to blame 
for their lack of engagement with FoRB.”  However, an underlying reason may be a 
question of normative perceptions among human rights advocates (and development 
practitioners as well). Whereas advocating for women’s liberation in the global South is 
considered progressive, the same image does not hold for championing the rights of 
those who hold religious beliefs. The same applies for environmentalists, development 
practitioners and human rights activists who are seeking to protect indigenous people 
and their ecologies but who are not originally from these communities. Undoubtedly 
promoting the ability of indigenous people and religious minorities to represent 
themselves and amplify their voices where they are marginalised is key, however, what is 
argued here is that there is a need to challenge the misguided assumption that one 
needs to be religious (a person of faith) to engage with the cause of advancing religious 
freedom or redressing religious inequalities. For example, in the aftermath of the 
Egyptian uprising in 2011, there was significant interest on the part of international and 
national civil society organisations with the commitment to supporting locally-led 
inclusive development policies, as well as on the part of international feminist 
organisations to ensure that any political transition was gender-sensitive. However, both 
the documentation of risks and policy recommendations completely ignored how the 
political ascendency of religiously conservative Islamist movements was affecting the 
position and situation of poor Coptic women (i.e. intersection of poverty, religious 
marginality and gender). In other words, feminist activists and development 
programmers that may or may not be people of faith, should have, on account of their 
commitment to inclusivity, incorporated the inequalities experienced by Coptic women in 
their analysis of the situation of women on the ground more broadly and the kinds of 
policies they formulated (see Tadros 2015).    
 
Another major challenge to development programming engaging with religious 
inequalities seriously are the potential tensions with other inequalities. For example, 
some international donors would put religious minorities, indigenous groups, transpeople 
and the disabled all under the same basket of vulnerable people or those suffering from 
exclusion. However, on the ground, although all of the above may experience various 
levels of powerlessness, they do not necessarily see themselves as part and parcel of the 
same process of exclusion. For example, in Nigeria, while there have been instances 
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where women leaders from the two main faiths (Islam and Christianity) were able to 
collaborate around championing girls’ education as part of a common agenda around 
gender equality, their commitment to gender equality did not extend to lesbian women, 
and in fact they organised collectively against the extension of rights to LGBTQ 
(Nagarajan 2018).  
 
In some instances, marginalised members of religious minorities may not only not show 
any solidarity with LGBTQI as a marginalised group but may, indeed, hold the same 
homophobic attitudes towards them as are prevalent in that society more broadly. One 
LGBTQI activist queried how CREID can advocate for the rights of religious minorities 
when many of its leaders are homophobic? (personal conversation with LGBTQI activist, 
anonymised, September 2019). The idea of the indivisibility of rights, while theoretically 
coherent, is very messy on the ground for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned 
above, the assumption that individuals or groups who experience a violation of rights 
may empathise with each other’s exclusion is not a given. Second, there may be real 
tensions ideologically and pragmatically between one set of rights and another (for 
example in the case above, between women’s rights and religious interpretations of 
religious texts on sexuality). Third, which rights gain public visibility domestically or 
internationally is often associated with factors beyond the actual rights in question. As 
mentioned earlier, the association of the US promotion of FoRB with the Republican 
party has meant that those endorsing or challenging FoRB domestically have had to 
contend with how they wish to position themselves in relation to the political agenda 
more broadly of this political party. The indivisibility of rights conceptually is perhaps 
underpinned by the assumption that all rights will be given the same prominence in any 
framings of inclusive development. However, which rights assume centre stage in 
international development policy frameworks shifts across time, with operational 
implications for implementing any agenda that is premised on an integrated approach to 
the promotion of inclusion.  
  
 
2 Development Frameworks 
In this section we reflect on a number of well-known development frameworks, all of 
which have been influential at different times in the last 40 years.  We examine them for 
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whether and how they incorporate attention to religion, belief or religious inequalities. 
We find that religion, belief and faith have been largely absent from explicit 
incorporation into development frameworks. Yet, the same literature frequently 
incorporates other vulnerability-identifying factors of individuals and social groupings – 
such as gender, disability, ethnicity and refugee status. There are reasons for this, related 
largely to what has been discussed in part one. These include, among others, a rejection 
of the positive rhetoric of colonisation which became so heavily associated with religion, 
the secularisation of the social sciences, the politicisation of religion and a general post-
modern milieu of the rejection of anything that looks like a dogmatic truth claim.  
Another reason is likely linked to the increasing momentum from multilateral agencies 
for the development of scientific and measurable indicators for determining the impact 
of development interventions. Religion, faith and belief are less straightforward to 
measure than many other variables and tend to be neglected on this basis.   
 
Development frameworks (which translate to policy and programmes) frequently identify 
many minority ethnic groups or refugee populations as vulnerable and excluded on the 
basis of their ethnicity, gender or political leanings, leading to programmatic 
interventions targeted as gender-based empowerment, sensitisation and literacy training 
for migrants, etc.  Yet, the religious and belief systems of these social categories have 
not been well integrated or considered.  Interestingly, many of the identifying labels for 
the poor, marginalised and vulnerable are intimately related to, and often a proxy for, an 
individual’s or group’s religious identity or beliefs. An example would be Rohingya 
refugees who are often referred to as the ‘Rohingya Muslims’, which is a self-labelling 
they feel comfortable with using, but which is at odds with the Burmese state’s term for 
them as “Bengali.” This lack of inclusion of religion and belief in development 
frameworks and programming (whether intentional or through mere oversight) has very 
likely muted the hoped-for outcomes of many development initiatives, and may even 
have unintentionally led to regressive outcomes for those individuals and groups that 
development actors are seeking to serve, a theme we will explore in future CREID papers. 
 
Over the last 20-30 years, development paradigms have been increasingly open to 
considerations of wellbeing, participation, rights and inclusion – on paper at least, 
moving away from a largely economic evaluation of lives and their contribution to 
economic progress (for instance the move from neoliberal theory to capabilities and 
‘development with a human face’). Frameworks of capabilities and human development, 
livelihoods and sustainable development, wellbeing, social inclusion, social inequalities 
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and social rights have all helpfully moved what was previously a fixation on economic 
modernisation and improvements in income along to a much richer and deeper 
understanding of the human condition.8 In fact, it would be fair to suggest that we have 
arrived at a global consensus on what constitutes good development – as epitomised in 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the ‘leaving no one behind’ agenda. 
Within the international development arena, no one disagrees with the language of 
inclusion, wellbeing, rights, participation and equality. Yet, most development actors, 
operational and academic, have yet to develop meaningful ways to focus on religious 
communities in terms of their advantage or disadvantage within a society.  
 
Surely, any development framework that claims to be fit for purpose in and of itself 
should be non-exclusionary regardless of whether it translates in any practical sense.  A 
framing or a conceptual understanding of development should be able to accommodate 
all groups.  Operationalisation of the framework may differ as it will stumble on politics, 
implementation and capacity problems, conflict and culture, but the framework must 
nevertheless aspire to be all-encompassing. Our purpose here is to review some well-
known international development conceptual and programmatic framings, highlighting if 
and how they engage with the language of ‘religion’ and belief. We spend time 
reflecting on why religion, belief and religious inequalities are largely absent from key 
influential frameworks and whether they can indeed be integrated into these frameworks. 
 
2.1 Human development and capability approach  
 
The human development approach marked an important and monumental shift in 
development thinking – from a focus on economic growth as the necessary component 
of development to a people-centred approach that emphasised the quality of people’s 
lives.  This approach takes a normative stance on the meaning of development and 
underpins more multidimensional, participatory and inclusive forms of development. 
Amartya Sen’s conception of “development as freedom” grew into the capability 
approach that focused on whether people were free and had the ability to fulfil their 
wants and needs. This freedom naturally encompasses the freedom to practice one’s 
religion, along with many other axes of freedom.  The lack of such freedom would 
significantly reduce the capability for most human beings to fulfill their needs and wants. 
Sen’s work provides the philosophical basis for the human development (HD) approach. 
 
8  While this is a huge leap forward in terms of recognising the value of spheres other than the 
economic for people’s wellbeing, the measurement of wellbeing remains economic and adheres to 
one of cost effectiveness.  
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First launched in 1990 by Haq and Sen, the Human Development Report (HDR) is an 
independent annually published report, commissioned by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP).  Its goal was to place people at the centre of 
the development process in terms of economic debate, policy and advocacy. The HDR 
1990 defined human development as “both the process of widening people’s choices 
and the level of their achieved wellbeing” (UNDP 1990:9). In other words, the purpose of 
development in this vision is to enhance people’s capabilities in a range of areas of their 
lives. These areas are specifically identified as the economic, social, political and cultural.  
Religion is not identified as a separate category but is subsumed, rather superficially, 
under the ‘cultural’ area. Of course, since 1990 the report has highlighted a wide range 
of themes, and more than 140 countries have published some 600 national Human 
Development Reports, so religion has certainly been covered by some of these.  
However, overall while the HD approach looks like an all-encompassing and inclusive 
approach, the religious and spiritual dimension to capabilities and quality of life gets very 
little attention.  
 
One of the key contributions of the HD approach was the development of non-economic 
indicators to measure wider aspects of development, most notably the Human 
Development Index. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a statistical composite index 
of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators, which are used to rank 
countries into four tiers of human development. Notably absent are indicators associated 
with religion, ethnicity, culture, etc. This is unsurprising considering the human 
development approach and HDI were developed in the 1980s. There was a need to keep 
them relatively simple to calculate and compare across countries and the measurement 
of development at that time was contained within the ‘secular’ spheres of life - as 
discussed in the first section. 
 
Nevertheless, in the last 20 years some attention has been paid to religion within the 
human development and capability approach. In 2000, the World Bank released its 
Voices of the Poor study (Narayan et al. 2000) which was informed by primary research 
using participatory poverty assessment in 23 countries, and through talking to thousands 
of poor people. The findings showed clearly that religion and spirituality constitute major 
aspects of people’s conception of wellbeing.  In addition, it showed that poor people 
tend to have more trust in religious leaders than political leaders (as do a number of 
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social barometers). It was through this study and other similar global consultations with 
people, such as the UNICEF and UN Women synthesis reports mentioned above, that 
religion and spirituality began to be recognised as critical issues within the realm of 
development. However, matters of religious inequalities exacerbated by political, 
economic and social factors did not feature in the findings. 
 
The spiritual dimension of wellbeing can be as important as the material dimension.  
Clearly, access to material or economic resources is key for physical survival and even for 
facilitating spiritual wellbeing and the adherence to certain beliefs. Yet, as shown by 
Alkire (2002) in a case study of a development project in rural Pakistan, a group of 
women chose a rose-cultivation project over a higher-income return goat-rearing one on 
the basis of the spiritual dimension of wellbeing that would be greater from the former. 
Roses were used in their religious ceremonies, and other benefits included the 
experience of connecting with the Maker through walking in rose fields. 
 
In 2004, the UNDP’s Human Development Report focused on cultural liberty, of which 
faith was a key sub-topic. As in the inequality framework (discussed below), this report 
conflates religion and culture. The report argues that faith is one of the most common 
reasons for cultural exclusion. Nevertheless, further Human Development Reports, such 
as the ones in 2010, 2011 and 2016 mention religion and faith only in passing or not at 
all. 
 
In a relatively recent 13-chapter edited volume on the human development and 
capability approach (Deneulin and Shahani 2009), one part of one chapter on culture and 
religion is devoted to a discussion of religion and the human development approach. 
This represents a step forward in bringing ‘religion’ to bear on development framing, 
however it is also indicative of the marginal status of considerations of religion - even 
within a development framework that claims to be all encompassing, multidimensional 
and inclusive. Reading through the edited volume, it is clear that religion and spirituality 
are not consistently incorporated or engaged with in any meaningful way, except for in 
one section.  In this section, Deneulin argues that various forms of discrimination, 
including religious, prevent people from fulfilling their wants and needs, which limits 
their capabilities. Recognising that “religion is often a significant, if not the most 
foundational part, of people’s lives which infuse what they value, who they are and what 
they do” (268), Deneulin argues that it should therefore be considered as a key 
contributor to wellbeing. Furthermore, Deneulin convincingly critiques the way that most 
40 
 
development models take an instrumental approach to religion, using various religion 
indicators as variables that impact negatively (and sometimes positively) on a set of 
goals of development indicators. This is classically the case in economic growth models 
of development, but was also obvious in the MDGs, and now in the SDGs, which are 
(arguably) premised on the implicit assumption that economic growth and economic 
opportunities are the primary development goals to be achieved. Wilber and Jameson 
(1980) criticised this approach to development on the basis that religion provides the 
moral fabric of many societies, thereby providing the norms within which the legitimacy 
of the development process can be assessed. They argue that viewing religion as simply 
a policy lever to achieve pre-defined goals that are external to the moral fabric of society 
will jeopardise any development process as it may alienate the people it is attempting to 
serve. 
 
Deneulin also takes time to point out the intricate linkages between religion and politics. 
Using case studies, she shows that “religion is never immune from power and is always 
embedded in social structures and political economy” (Deneulin 2009:268). In reference 
to the human rights-based framework, which the human development approach adheres 
to, we see that there can be a practical conflict between rights to religious liberty on the 
one hand and other rights, such as gender equality, on the other. Whether one set of 
rights takes precedence over another will clearly be worked out in the messy politics and 
culture of the context. In other words, religion does not sit entirely in a separate sphere 
from the other classic development domains – economy, politics and society. As 
Deneulin points out, the topics of culture and religion “remain a challenge for 
development for they expose the fragility of any conception of development with 
universalistic aspirations, and the complexities of the strive for human flourishing” (269). 
 
While Deneulin’s chapter on religion provides an important discussion of religion within 
the human development and capability framework, this work has not yet influenced the 
mainstream in terms of development theorising or mainstream policy documents. 
Nonetheless, there appear to be obvious entry points for bringing considerations of 
religion into the HD approach.  The barriers are really around the inability of the 
paradigm to simultaneously hold competing norms and rights that might on the one 
hand impinge on a person’s freedom, while at the same time provide liberty and 
increased functioning for another person. In this regard, the project of ‘mainstreaming’ 
religious inequality into development seems significantly more difficult than it has been 
for gender, ethnicity or disability. Following is a discussion of a number of propositions 
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for how the human development and capability framework can engage with religious 
inequalities, in terms of people being excluded on the basis of their faith intersecting 
with other identifiers. 
 
2.2 Horizontal inequalities  
While most of the religion and development literature is silent on the topic of religious 
inequalities, there is, nonetheless, one sub-section of the inequalities framework that 
incorporates a consideration of religion, namely the horizontal inequalities literature. 
Over the past 15 years, Frances Stewart has been one of the most influential thinkers in 
the area of inequalities and development.  The novelty of her work, as epitomised in an 
edited volume in 2005, has been to distinguish between vertical and horizontal 
inequalities (HI). Previously, development theories and measurement had been replete 
with discussions and measurement of economic inequality as measured by the classic 
Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient, where analysis of inequality was only ever linked to the 
‘vertical’ differences between individuals or households as measured by their income, 
expenditure or any other measure of accumulated resource (land, assets). Horizontal 
inequalities, on the other hand, “are inequalities in economic, social or political 
dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart 2005:3). For 
instance, the differences in health or education status of different ethnic groups in any 
one population might reflect horizontal inequalities in access for these groups to health 
and education provision.  Stewart argues that inequality between groups significantly 
increases the likelihood of conflict occurring (Stewart 2005; 2008; 2010). The primary 
focus of this literature is to show how horizontal inequalities spur conflict. To a much 
lesser extent, it also looks at the way such inequalities may be redressed.   
 
While focused primarily on the role of HI in causing and influencing conflict, this work 
has been influential for development thinkers and practitioners in understanding the role 
of the social, ethnic, cultural, political and religious in creating and sustaining inequality 
and deprivation. Along with a range of other identifiers (such as gender, ethnicity and 
geography) religion is identified as one obvious axis that can lead to cleavages between 
groups and resources in any society, yet it is not afforded the attention that is given to 
ethnicity and other categories. The HI framework does draw attention to religion as a 
cause of inequality as well as showing that culturally ascribed religious status can be an 
outcome of inequality, yet, the inclusion of religion and religious inequality remains 
largely marginal within this framework. One reason for this is that Stewart’s work gives 
prominence to the role of culture in defining group status - ‘culturally-defined groups’.  
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Of course, different cultures ascribe value and norms to different characteristics of 
individuals and groups, yet, as already discussed, more recent work makes the case that 
religion (along with its associated characteristics such as belief, spirituality) cannot be 
easily subsumed into a culturally defined category. 
 
In a similar way, most policy documents consider religious inequality as a sub-section of 
cultural inequality (WSSR 2016). Despite some similarities, the conflation of religion and 
culture is problematic as the former is based on transcendental fundaments that cannot 
be shifted, while culture is a social construct that is more flexible to change (Deneulin 
and Bano 2009). Even when disregarding the debate as to whether religion should be a 
sub-section of culture, cultural inequality is usually elaborated on with examples other 
than religion, as was demonstrated in the 2016 World Social Science Report on 
inequalities. This report addressed seven main categories of inequalities, one of which is 
cultural inequality. Despite the inclusion of religious inequality under this cultural theme, 
the issue is not addressed in depth. 
 
A noteworthy report in relation to religion and inequality comes from the global 
thematic consultation on the post-2015 development agenda organised by UNICEF and 
UN Women. This report is not a policy document but a synthesis report of a global 
public consultation. The report features religion to a much greater extent than other 
policy documents reviewed, going as far as to recommend the collection of data on 
religious and intersectional discrimination. This might be expected as religion is an 
important concern for the vast majority of people across the world. It is intriguing to see 
that a report based on a global public consultation consistently includes considerations 
of religious inequalities, whereas reports written by development organisations 
themselves and academics have tended to downplay or exclude them. This indicates a 
disconnect between the development apparatus and general public perceptions of the 
significance of religious inequalities. Despite this highlighting of religious inequalities in 
the report, consideration of religion was still not included in its key messages. 
 
In addition, many reports that engage with intersecting inequalities typically frame 
religious inequality as a possible compounding factor, but no examples of how religious 
inequality interacts with (and reinforces) other inequalities is given. This is the case in the 
2016 World Social Science Report. Another example is a 2013 report by the UN 
Economic Commission on Europe (UNECE) that focused specifically on creating an index 
to measure intersecting inequalities. While this report mentions religion as a possible 
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compounding factor, it is not included in the proposed index. This gives the impression 
that religion is considered as an afterthought in the intersectionality framework.  
Furthermore, there are a few influential global reports that do not contain any mention 
of religion, such as the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)’s 
Report on the World Social Situation 2013: Inequality Matters. The report proposed that 
in order to accelerate progress towards achieving the MDGs and shape a global vision 
for the development agenda after 2015, stakeholders, along with addressing poverty, 
needed to tackle inequalities. Vertical inequality related to income, education, health 
indicators and wealth are discussed in detail, as are some horizontal inequalities related 
to social groupings such as, age, disability, ethnicity and migration status. Yet, there is no 
mention of religious inequalities. 
 
In summary, while most development literature that addresses horizontal inequalities 
mentions religion as a possible ground for discrimination, very little elaboration is 
provided.  This is in stark contrast with other factors such as gender, race and ethnicity, 
which are considered in depth.  
 
2.3 Convertibility of capital theories of development  
Stewart sees HI presenting themselves in four areas: political participation, economic 
aspects, social aspects and cultural status. There are obvious links between these areas 
and typically an inequality in one leads to the compounding of inequality in another, 
usually leading to inequality in access to an economic outcome. In fact, “one type of 
capital requires others to be productive” (Stewart 2005:13). The four areas presented by 
Stewart build on the different ‘capitals’ or ‘assets’ so widely used in the social capital 
literature and the sustainable livelihoods framework – economic, social, human, political 
and natural. A number of sociologists have sought to explain how different forms of 
capital and resources produce and reproduce inequality and opportunity.  Bourdieu, in 
his classic work on The Forms of Capital (1986) expands the concept of capital to include 
assets formed by access to culturally valuable symbols, ways of life and social networks. 
Money carries powerful symbolic properties that confer meaning, dignity and relevance 
to people’s lives (Carruthers and Espeland 1998). By thinking of worth only as economic 
value we overlook (1) other important measures of wealth and (2) “other economically 
important types of exchange”. For instance, as shown by Adato et al (2016) from their 
work in South Africa, adolescents indicate that they obtain self-worth and dignity 
through a range of ‘status’ goods, such as clean clothes, accepted hairstyles, the ‘right’ 
shoes, etc.  
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Bourdieu goes on to make a further point: that all capitals (social, assets, cultural, 
symbolic) are, under certain conditions, convertible to economic capital or monetary 
value. For instance, in the case of status goods for youth, these can be converted into 
valuable status capital, which facilitates them staying on in school, inclusion in social 
networks and ultimately opportunities that convert to economic capital.  In the same way 
symbolic capital can convert to economic gain, social capital is also convertible.  
Bourdieu sees social capital as the capital “one gains from personal connections” such as 
membership in groups, including families, clubs, and solidarity groups. These connections 
can lead to jobs, loans, valuable connections and investment opportunities. In other 
words, they can alleviate material constraints in an indirect way. These connections are 
sustained through an exchange of material goods (e.g. gifts) and symbolic goods (e.g. 
mutual recognition). In fact, “the profits which accrue from membership in a group 
[network] are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” (Bourdieu 1986:286).  
An important contribution of Bourdieu is the realisation that people are motivated by 
social and psychosocial incentives and constraints as much as by material incentives and 
constraints. In other words, while the other capitals might eventually convert to material, 
economic benefits, not all incentives are primarily economically motivated. 
 
How does any of this relate to religious or spiritual capital, concepts that have been 
completely overlooked and under-theorised by livelihoods and social capital literature? It 
is entirely plausible, even obvious, that some forms of religious capital might equate with 
what Bourdieu terms “symbolic” or even “cultural” capital.  For instance, in the sense that 
adherence to specific religious affiliations or denominations form symbolic capital, such 
as attendance at a politically established institution (such as the Church of England), or 
wearing specific religious attire and dress, might convert into certain social or political 
privileges and economic resources. Yet religious capital in the form of internally held 
beliefs and faith systems are unlikely to have standard economic convertibility simply 
because the incentives for holding these “capitals” are not based upon economic 
fundamentals but rather on spiritual ones.  The fulfilment of wellbeing and needs does 
not proceed through the standard pathways of economic liberalism and material and 
consumptive satiation. Rather, the fulfilment is based on ‘transcendental fundaments’ – 
that is, spirituality that transcends the material realm and is not able to be tweaked by 
the classic economic policy levers.  This is perhaps the most compelling reason as to why 
development theories and policies writ large do not make any committed attempts to 
integrate religious beliefs and faith into development theories.  
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It would be difficult for this latter type of spiritual capital to be integrated into 
development theories and frameworks as a significant number of them of them implicitly 
or explicitly rest on the notion of homo economicus (the economic man). A 2015 World 
Development Report on ‘Mind, Society and Behaviour’ signalled an effort by the World 
Bank to move away from rational behavioural approaches to development and decisions 
making, yet the objective of development remained firmly focused on the economic 
realm. By recognising that behaviours cannot always be modified and manipulated by 
appealing to economic, social or political rationality, it is more understandable why 
people and groups are willing to sacrifice needs, rights, wellbeing, and even life, in 
pursuit of other belief-motivated goals. Or, conversely, in the name of ideology, people 
can propagate social harmony or hate towards the religious other! 
 
2.4 Social inclusion 
The World Bank defines social inclusion as “the process of improving the ability, 
opportunity, and dignity of people, disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take 
part in society” (World Bank 2013). Considering religion is often a defining factor in 
making up one’s identity, it would be expected that religion features in the social 
inclusion framework. Social exclusion based on religion is extremely common, with 
proven resultant negative effects of alienation and resentment (Myanmar being a case in 
point). It would therefore be beneficial to include this factor in social inclusion analyses. 
However, while religion is often mentioned as a common ground for exclusion, this is 
rarely elaborated on. This is similar to what can be observed in the inequality framework. 
 
One report that does consider religion at some length is the World Bank’s (2013) 
Inclusion Matters report. It recognises religious identity as one of the most common 
grounds for exclusion along with gender, race, caste, ethnicity and disability status. In 
addition, it shows religious inequality as one of multiple intersecting inequalities. While 
the report addresses the fact that religion has often been a strong exclusionary force in 
many societies, it also argues that religious leaders can therefore be engaged as possible 
agents of inclusion. The report pays considerable attention to the exclusion of migrants. 
Considering the fact that large groups of migrants do not share the same religion as 
their host country or community, religion often plays a part in their social exclusion. This 
group could therefore be an important case study for social exclusion on religious 
grounds, as well as its intersection with migrant identity. Finally, the report includes 
religious freedom in its proposed measures of wellbeing. Amy Chua (2004) provides 
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another interesting insight into the role of minorities – ethnic and religious – in creating 
tensions because they are the dominant power holders in a country.  She makes the case 
that this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in developing countries (South East Asia 
especially). 
 
UNDESA’s 2018 World Social Situation report aims to promote inclusion through social 
protection. The report devotes significant space to inclusion and protection based on 
gender, youth, old age, disability, indigenous people, and migrants. However, religion is 
mentioned only in passing as a ground for exclusion without being discussed further. In 
addition, the most recent International Labour Organization (ILO) World Social Protection 
Report (2017-2019), which focuses on labour market discrimination, includes no mention 
of religion. 
 
2.5 Sustainable development and the ‘Leaving No One Behind’ agenda 
In the early 1990s ‘sustainable development’ emerged as a popular catchphrase for 
thinking about a new recipe for development. While the early discussions of sustainable 
development faltered on competing and often vague definitions, it evolved and has been 
embraced by a range of non-governmental and governmental organisations as a new 
paradigm of development. The term sustainable development brings together two very 
distinct concepts.  The first being ‘development’ as frequently understood and measured 
by growth in national income, the economy, or other socially desirable phenomenon 
related to material wellbeing.  The second, ‘sustainable’, is frequently related to 
‘ecological sustainability’ or being environmentally sound (Tolba 1984). In other words, 
sustainable development is a process by which economic and social change is also 
ecologically sustainable.  Of course, the notion of sustainable development, particularly 
when development is assumed to be synonymous with economic growth, has been 
critiqued as internally inconsistent, but this is not our purpose here (see Lele 1991).  
 
Most recently, the sustainable development paradigm has attracted unprecedented 
attention as it provides the impetus for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 
global political shift from the MDGs (where the focus was on lower income countries 
only and targets to grow them out of poverty and low economic growth through 
investments in education and health), to the SDGs (where the focus is a commitment by 
all countries to simultaneously tackle development and sustainability), marked a 
significant recognition of the interconnectedness of ‘the North’ and ‘the South’ as well as 
the ecological with the economic.  
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Furthermore, a move from the MDGs to the SDGs also facilitated an innovation with the 
“inclusion of the concept of Leaving No One Behind, implying a clear intent to move 
away from the former approach of picking off the low-hanging fruit” (Stuart and 
Woodroffe 2016:70). The Leave No One Behind policy agenda aligns to the questions of 
social inclusion/exclusion discussed above. The SDG document says: 
 
As we embark on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left 
behind.  Recognizing that the dignity of the human person is fundamental, we 
wish to see the Goals and targets met for all nations and peoples and for all 
segments of society.  And we will endeavor to reach the furthest behind first.  
(United Nations 2015). 
 
Given the explicit focus on Leave No One Behind in Agenda 2030 (where the SDGs are 
laid out), one would imagine that religion and beliefs would get significant airtime, 
especially as the SDGs form the basis of most global development policies and 
programmes. In fact, leaving no-one behind implies two things: first, that non-income-
based inequalities are tackled (for instance for those facing discriminations through 
access, social or cultural constraint); and second, that governments and development 
partners need to ensure that the most marginalised and excluded groups make progress 
more quickly than other groups.  This would ensure that the inequality gap is reduced - 
not just inequality in income, but across a range of wellbeing indicators. Agenda 2030 
does pay attention to gender, age, disability, ethnicity, and a whole range of other 
identity indicators that are correlated with exclusion and marginalisation, yet religion and 
belief as an identity marker are conspicuously not dealt with. Religion is mentioned only 
in passing in the ‘leave no one behind’ clause, as well as in SDG 10.2 on reducing 
inequalities, which recognises religion as a possible ground for discrimination. It is 
therefore unsurprising that most flagship development programmes that ground their 
vision in Agenda 2030 do not take religion into account, beyond vowing not to 
discriminate on religious grounds and engaging religious leaders and organisations to 
further the SDGs. While the latter is already an improvement, Agenda 2030 does not 
suggest a path or a development initiative for development organisations to address 
religion as a basis of exclusion and discrimination.   
 
Considering the importance of religion, belief and spirituality to people’s wellbeing 
across the world, it appears that the limited attention to these issues in the SDGs is an 
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oversight.  Yet, there must be reasons for this, similarly to those discussed above, that 
relate to the political and economic ethos which implicitly frame and promote global 
development agendas and policy. As pointed out by Lele years ago, “the proponents of 
sustainable development are faced with a dilemma that affects any program of political 
action and social change: the dilemma between the urge to take strong stands on 
fundamental concerns and the need to gain wide political acceptance and support” (Lele 
1991:618). While the Leave No One Behind agenda recognises that people face different 
forms of inequality other than those related to income which influence their experiences 
of poverty, the ideology framing the SDGs is still fundamentally a neoliberal one, with 
economic growth and income indicators as the gold standard measure. It would be naïve 
for us to assume that governments and global actors, by virtue of signing up to the 
SDGs, now universally embrace the embedding of religion and religious equality within 
their development policies. There are political, territorial and ideological reasons why 
considerations of religious equality are not given a good airing.    
 
There are also practical reasons related to the practical difficulties of measuring religion 
and belief and thus creating efficient indicators for these. Gough and McGregor (2007) 
argue that religion is not traditionally included in wellbeing indicators as it cannot be 
expressed in economic terms. In addition, religion is a relatively ill-defined social 
category and is therefore difficult to assess. Deneulin and Rakodi (2011) argue that 
religion should largely be analysed through discourse as it changes and is 
multidimensional. However, discourse analysis is not traditionally used to inform 
mainstream development policy. For this reason, it would be beneficial to create 
wellbeing indicators that also portray religious dimensions, like religious discrimination. 
While important, this is complicated by the overall lack of data on religion (Rakodi 2012). 
What is needed in order to measure religiously related discrimination and inequalities is 
first and foremost disaggregated data on religious affiliation. This may be complicated in 
terms of the sensitivities related to gathering such information, but it is not conceptually 
complicated. 
 
In 2009, Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi published a report on the request of the French 
government on the measurement of economic performance and social progress. The aim 
of this report was to move away from measuring progress and wellbeing only in terms of 
GDP. In this report, several suggestions were made for religious indicators and sub-
indicators, such as an indicator for access to justice, with sub-indicators for ethnicity, 
religion, race, gender, etc. Creating such sub-indicators could help mainstream a religion-
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sensitive approach to wellbeing. However, it seems that the report’s recommendations 
have not yet been implemented as most wellbeing indices do not account for religion. A 
rare example of an existing index with a sub-indicator for religious freedom is the Social 
Progress Index (SPI).  This was developed under technical guidance from Harvard 
Business School and from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  In 2013, the global 
SPI was launched for 50 countries in 2013 to measure a comprehensive array of 
components of social and environmental performance and aggregate them into an 
overall framework. The index contains three elements: basic human needs, wellbeing, and 
opportunity. A key feature of the index is that it excludes economic variables. 
 
 
3 Synergising FoRB and Development  
One of the key messages emerging from this critical enquiry is that any approach 
premised on “add religious freedom to the religion and development agenda and stir” 
will be deeply flawed and potentially unintentionally worsen religious inequalities on the 
ground. In this final section we highlight some of the critical questions central to 
mainstreaming FoRB in international development and development paradigms. These 
questions are clustered around a number of themes: (1) Why should we consider 
mainstreaming religious inequalities in development? (2) How fit for purpose are our 
existing development framings? and (3) What opportunities exist for integrating FoRB in 
development?  
 
3.1 Why should we consider mainstreaming religious inequalities in 
development? 
This paper has delineated the historical, political, conceptual and methodological 
challenges and conundrums of recognising, let alone integrating FoRB in international 
development. Indeed, the very legitimacy of the proposition that FoRb should feature as 
one of the issues that international development should be engaging with is deeply 
contested. In a seminar on whether the integration of religious marginality in 
development is a pathway of recognising that creed and need converge, (Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, 14th October 20199), one of the recurring 
questions was whether, as outsiders, we have any right to hold to account other 
countries for their FoRB record. The problematique of external, Western actors finger-
 
9  See: www.ids.ac.uk/events/religious-inequalities-in-development-where-need-meets-creed/. 
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pointing in the arena of human rights, be it women’s equality, FoRB or other rights, has 
consistently been raised, in particular on account of the inconsistency and indeed 
hypocrisy with which human rights have been championed. However, a counter 
argument is that it would be inconsistent, even hypocritical, to pronounce a commitment 
to leaving no one behind while purposely leaving behind those who suffer from the 
intersection of religious marginality and poverty.  
 
The efforts at eliciting a paradigmatic shift in international development towards 
removing its secular blinkers are important for understanding the multidimensionality of 
the power dynamics at work, beyond the visible and the material. Such efforts are also 
important in encouraging a more comprehensive and realistic mapping of actors on the 
ground, which include both secular as well as religious expressions of agency, and those 
where the demarcations are more blurred. However, the integration of a religious lens 
into development is a necessary but insufficient approach to addressing FoRB. On 
account of the reasons for this that have been highlighted in this paper, there cannot be 
an “add religion and stir” approach to addressing religious inequality. It needs to be 
recognised in its own right as an issue that merits its own concerted focus. In other 
words, a deepening of a religion-sensitive lens onto development, even if consistently 
applied across the board, will not by default contribute to redressing inequalities that 
intersect across religion and other identifiers. Redressing religious inequalities needs to 
be recognised in its own right as part of the broader agenda of tackling the kinds of 
inequalities that lead to exclusion and marginalisation.  
 
As with the global advocacy for gender equality in international development, we cannot 
overlook sensitivities around a deeply politicised theme such as FoRB. However, as with 
gender equality, the critical questions are who is doing the mainstreaming, what 
legitimacies do they wield in relation to whom, and how is mainstreaming promoted? 
Admittedly, as a social category of analysis, gender and religion are not the same thing, 
and neither are gender and religious equalities/inequalities necessarily driven by the 
same dynamics. However, gender mainstreaming in development may be relevant for 
mainstreaming religious inequalities because both are deeply politicised and contentious. 
Moreover, development actors, policy and practice also suffered from being inadvertently 
and deliberately gender blind, with gender power hierarchies representing a clear blind 
spot. Given the resistance to addressing religious equalities in international development, 
the historical and ongoing struggle to mainstream gender in development presents 
insights into eliciting positive change. The intention here is not to duplicate strategies 
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and tactics, but rather to understand processes of negotiation, navigation, and even 
normalisation. A forthcoming paper on the lessons learnt from fifty years of gender 
mainstreaming will feature in 2020. However, one starting point highlighted in the 
upcoming paper is that collection of evidence is needed on many levels. These include 
how intersecting inequalities affect the lives of religious minorities, the extent to which 
they are included/excluded from development access and outreach, and also the extent 
to which development programmes have implicitly affected the positioning of religious 
minorities on the ground, whether intentionally or unintentionally.  
 
3.2 How fit for purpose are our existing development framings?   
The consideration of a range of influential development frameworks above show very 
clearly the extent to which these development paradigms have not, and in many cases 
cannot, accommodate themes of FoRB.  Despite the fact that recent development 
frameworks have made huge efforts to include consideration of historically excluded and 
vulnerable groups (such as those with disabilities, ethnic minorities, children, refugees, 
women and older people), overall, religion and faith have been absent from explicit 
incorporation into development frameworks.  Any mention of religious-inspired forms of 
exclusion are largely superficial. This has resulted in the policy and programmatic 
outworking of theoretical paradigms which has meant that many people have been 
unintentionally, and sometimes intentionally, excluded from participation in, and benefits 
from, development processes. For these people and groups, the frameworks are not fit 
for purpose.  
 
Theoretically, under the most recent umbrella of inclusive development (leaving no one 
behind and the SDGs), all kinds of excluded causes and peoples can be addressed 
alongside each other. Sadly, while religion as a categorical and measurable factor has 
become an increasingly accepted variable and policy lever of development, 
considerations of faith, belief, spirituality and religious inequalities remain a taboo for 
some international development actors. Foreign policy and development actors writ large 
are not explicitly interested in the religious and spiritual wellbeing of individuals and 
groups. They remain fundamentally interested in economic progress and development. 
Yet, as Van Beek (2000) points out, “people’s spirituality is integrally interconnected with 
the decisions they make regarding their development” (41).  
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We have argued that, despite some progress towards adopting a more holistic approach, 
a substantial challenge facing well-established development frameworks is their implicit 
acceptance of the economic as the only measure for development success. For example, 
the livelihood capitals and assets people own can be used for, and converted to, the 
accumulation of economic capital. We have made the claim that this type of model is 
only minimally useful for considerations of religion.  The spiritual (and faith) realm is not 
convertible to the economic - it is private, and not understandable to all those trying to 
engage with it.  By its very nature then, this makes it a very different ‘capital’ and for this 
reason it cannot easily be incorporated into current framings. The understanding of 
religion or faith as capital, or spiritual capital, is critical for understanding religious 
minorities’ coping strategies when faced with religious-inspired forms of exclusion and 
targeting. For example, when faced with discrimination or even persecution, how does 
their religious capital affect their choice of responses: does it inspire resistance, 
subversion, accommodation or “cacoonisation”, a response of finding solace in one’s own 
community’s heritage while assuming a minimal role in broader public good? What 
influences those interfaces between human agency and reacting or coping with religious-
inspired exclusion?  
 
The less obvious challenges to the incorporation of religion and religious inequalities in 
development framings lies in the implicit normative assumptions that have underpinned 
the vast majority of development paradigms over the past 50-60 years. This assumption, 
that is rarely stated, is about where power is located within a society or economy. Power 
lies with states and governments and this can be influenced by external actors and 
global commitments to a significant degree. It is further implicit that, overall, states 
represent people’s interests and their interest is primarily for economic prosperity for all 
– implying accessibility for all regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion, etc. Once we 
recognise that power is very often held by other groups and entities (often overlapping 
with the interests of those who hold state-funded positions), frequently with specific and 
passionately-held religious beliefs, it becomes clear that the notion that the state will be 
able to manage a development process in ways that venerate universal rights, equal 
opportunities and inclusion for all is flawed.  Development frameworks need to evolve to 
recognise and include pathways for change that are directed and managed through 
power situated in different places and groups within society, and also within 
institutionalised religion. How this pans out in terms of the classic ‘universalising’ 
principles’ rhetoric of the current ‘leaving no one behind’ agenda needs to be carefully 
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considered and theorised within development frameworks that can accommodate more 
than simply the economic or that which can be reduced to the quantifiable.  
 
As Deneulin points out, the topics of culture and religion “remain a challenge for 
development for they expose the fragility of any conception of development with 
universalistic aspirations, and the complexities of the strive for human flourishing” 
(2009:269). Most development models include considerations of religion in an 
instrumentalist way by using various ‘religion indicators’ as variables that impact 
negatively (and sometimes positively) on a set of goals of development indicators.  
Viewing religion simply as a policy lever to achieve pre-defined goals that are external to 
the moral fabric of society will jeopardise any development process as it may alienate 
the people it is attempting to serve. 
 
Our analysis here suggests that development framings and paradigms need to embrace 
ethics - an ethics of development. The language of universal and equal rights is not 
acceptable to many societies and therefore development studies does not have a 
credible normative position in these places. Are there some basic ethical principles that 
can inform a more credible framing of development?  How would we arrive at these? 
Perhaps ‘do not harm’ is the one that has the most chance of any form of universal buy-
in. 
 
3.3 What opportunities exist for integrating FoRB in development?  
International development has been increasingly adopting a multi- and inter- disciplinary 
approach in its framing. One of the merits is the recognition that reflexivity is key to 
good practice (Eyben 2014). Development academics, programmers and policymakers 
relate to religion in a deeply subjective manner (like others) and it is expedient that this 
would extend to how they relate to freedom of religion or belief as well. How do we get 
development actors to reflect on their own biases, assumptions and discomforts on 
engaging with religious inequalities as they would with other forms of inequalities? 
Drawing on feminist conceptions and standpoints may be a good starting place, 
encouraging actors to articulate in explicit terms where they position themselves in 
relation to the debates on integrating freedom of religion or belief in development. The 
concept of positionality is especially important for unpacking where development actors 
are perceived to have legitimacy to champion an agenda that incorporates religious 
inequalities and where they have a serious legitimacy deficit to do so, even when they 
have the best of intentions of being inclusive. With many parts of international 
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development being more open to thinking reflexively about their positioning, not just 
their technical interventions, this may allow for a nuanced approach to navigating the 
sensitivities of engaging with religious inequalities. 
  
The second inroad to integrating FoRB in development is in its framing. This paper has 
purposely framed FoRB in terms of religious (in)equalities. Like any frame of reference, 
religious inequalities as a term has its strengths and weaknesses. An obvious weakness is 
that the term FoRB is more all-encompassing since it includes those of no belief or those 
whose beliefs are at variance with the mainstream even if they belong to the same 
religion.  Another weakness with the term religious equality is that some may equate it 
with equivalent rights, one set for one group and another set for another.  
 
In some countries, the term freedoms may seem less contentious, for example, a 
government may grant certain ‘measured’ freedoms such as freedom to worship under 
certain conditions or freedom to engage in religious education, but with constraints. 
Conversely, equality means that there are no special privileges for minorities, while 
majorities hold privileged positions. Equality is non-discriminatory between people. These 
weaknesses are perhaps outweighed by the opportunities for integrating FoRB through 
the concept of religious equalities. One key recommendation is that mainstreaming 
equality along the lines of religion, gender, class, race, geography, etc. in international 
development may seem more in line with addressing intersecting inequalities than 
introducing FoRB-sensitive development. The politicisation of FoRB in terms of its 
association with being a tool of foreign policy means that it can be read as 
inflammatory.  
 
Even if “non-belief” is not explicit in religious equality, it is important to note that 
development, having been secular in its framings, had no qualms with the absence of 
belief. The evidence shows very clearly that atheists are vulnerable to religious 
otherisation and are indeed targeted in many contexts on account of their self-
proclaimed non-faith (or even rumours surrounding individuals being associated with 
atheism even when they did not publicise such views). However, this discrimination was 
largely initiated by state and society: international development programming, being by 
and large a secular construct, did not discriminate against those who suffered on 
account of their non-belief. Nonetheless, this is a propositional statement on the nature 
of international development programming and frameworks and cannot be confirmed or 
challenged without comprehensive review of evidence on the ground.   
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The language of equality is one that is decipherable in international development. 
International development has recognised the importance of equality along racial, 
gender, income and geographic lines among many. Moreover, as development shifts 
more towards recognising the intersectionality of identity, this paves the way for 
exploring how religious marginality intersects with poverty, gender, geography, political 
orientation and other factors in influencing how individuals and people experience 
exclusion.  
 
Perhaps another important opportunity in the use of the term religious equality is it 
disentangles the cause from the political baggage with which it has been associated, 
namely its political appropriation to advance foreign policy interests that trump redress 
of religious discrimination, or the inconsistency and incoherence with which some of its 
advocates have selectively endorsed it. What is proposed here is not that religious 
equality as a concept or goal will be the magic bullet that will ensure the inclusion of all. 
At the very least, it endeavours to normalise thinking about religious marginality, where 
relevant, in the scoping, planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
any initiatives that endeavour to make development more inclusive. More importantly, it 
is a stepping stone towards addressing the two key conundrums that this paper has 
identified as affecting the potential for FoRB-sensitive international development policy, 
practice and frameworks. First, redressing religious inequalities where they intersect with 
other inequalities is a framing of the problematique that is one step removed from the 
deeply politicised framing of FoRB emanating from its genealogy and its sometimes 
contentious appropriations in foreign policy. Second, the language of equality is not 
alien to international development frameworks that speak of inclusion, leaving no one 
behind, addressing the needs of people on the margins and so forth. In the upcoming 
series of CREID papers, we will explore further the conceptual, ideological and 
operational dimensions of what international development that is FoRB-sensitive or 
addressing religious inequalities may look like.  
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